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Introduction
Today U.S. troops still operate in both Afghanistan and Iraq seemingly "stuck" in Phase IV whose duration has been significantly longer than planners anticipated. The extended military involvement has caused the public and some politicians to criticize the Bush Administration for failing to provide an "exit strategy" for both Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi
Freedom. In military terms, what the critics were calling for were viable termination criteria for both operations. Their call seems a sensible request but in the contemporary security environment, it is a request seldom answered.
Public impatience with an open-ended military commitment is not new. In fact, since the end of the Cold War, the United States has had a consistently poor record for restoring civil government and implementing a viable exit strategy. The term "exit strategy" is a generic term, which seems equivalent to the US doctrinal term conflict termination. Joint Publication 1-02
Department of Defense Dictionary of Associated Terms, defines conflict termination as "the specified standards approved by the President and or the Secretary of Defense that must be met before a joint operation can be concluded." 3 Professor Fred Ikle, in his book, Every War Must
End, underscored the importance of planning for conflict termination by stating, "not only military leaders are sometimes guilty of designing wars as if they had to build a bridge that spans only half a river. Civilian leaders, too, may order the initiation of a military campaign without being troubled by the fact that they have no plan for bringing their war to a close". 4 In other words, both civil and military leaders tend to focus on the opening military operations and the broad goals for those operations and neglect to define the conditions that will end the use of force.
Conflict termination is a topic military and civilian leaders have wrestled with since the beginning of warfare. In fact, the Spartan King Archidamus, prior to the outset of the Peloponnesian War, cautioned his fellow citizens and allies against rushing into war, and reminded them that it was hard to predict how and when the war would end. 5 In an extended conflict, the challenge is to end a conflict on terms while maintaining the support of the impatient to achieve by that war and how he intends to conduct it. The former is its political purpose; the later its operational objective." 6 Clausewitz argues that warfare is divided into two interlinked elements, the political element and the military element. A nation preparing for war must clearly think through both the political and the military element before going to war. The first step is to determine the political element because the political element determines the end-state of the war including the desired national goals and objectives. The second step is to determine the military component. The military component details how the military will go about prosecuting the war in order to achieve the political endstate of the war.
Although many US military operations since the end of Cold War have ended improperly, the failure has not been due to a flaw in doctrine, but because senior civilian and military leaders have chosen to ignore or have neglected the complexities of regime change and termination. Politicians often hope the security objectives can be achieved and the troops brought home quickly to appease the voters. Frequently the political concerns have resulted in inadequate termination criteria based largely on time rather than realistic benchmarks that measure the ability of a local population to protect its citizens and provide basic services. Consequently, the employment of the US military has not always translated into lasting accomplishments favorable to US Foreign Policy once the military is withdrawn.
The research reported in this monograph sought to to explain why senior military or civilian leaders have neglected the specification of termination criteria. To provide the answer it was necessary to consider four possible explanations. The first possible explanation is simply that military doctrine never addressed the requirement or that military theory neglects war 6 Carl Von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), 579. termination. A second possible answer was that difficulties in terminating military operations were seen by both civilian and military leaders as not within the purview of the military; something that should be addressed by the Department of State, the National Security Council, or the United Nations. Next, there is a possibility that many of the US military interventions were not intended to create a long-term commitment to the stability of a particular government; e.g. Bosnia in 1995. Consequently, the failure to define clear termination criteria may be a virtue.
Finally, extended military commitments may simply be the consequences of unique circumstances that were not foreseeable when planning began.
Each of the hypothesized explanations is plausible. The task was to discover what answer the evidence supports. To get at the root of the issue it was logical to begin by investigating military doctrine. That task was complicated by the fact that military doctrine changes periodically so if two decades of US military interventions were to be examined then the doctrine had to be revisited from time to time to determine whether guidance had changed or lessons from military operations had been captured. Thus, doctrine is examined in conjunction with the individual case studies. In contrast, the military and political theory that had an impact on US planning predates the invasion of Panama and thus, only influenced the early doctrinal efforts.
Lastly, some salient cases of US military intervention prior to September 11, 2001 were examined to assess whether those cases taught any lessons that either were learned or were learned poorly.
US operations in Panama and Haiti were selected for review because both dealt with regime change. A review of these operations revealed that regime change complicates the task of planning and execution of termination criteria. The lessons learned from these operations provided a preview of what to anticipate for subsequent regime change operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. A review of US military interventions aimed at regime change since 1989 reveals that foreign policy decisions prevented clearly defining termination criteria. Consequently, because senior US military leaders disliked nation building, they used this unclear termination guidance as justification to avoid their obligation to properly plan for termination.
Conflict Termination Prior to September 11, 2001

Conflict Termination and Operations in Panama
The Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 assigned the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) responsibility for preparing joint doctrine. It took some time to develop a body of joint doctrine. When the US was planning operations in Panama, 1988 Panama, -1989 Operations, dated 1986, did not discuss termination. Although Field Manual 100-5 discussed operational art, it did not include the concept of termination as a characteristic. The manual only hinted vaguely at the significance of termination in an appendix. Appendix A specified the need for the president and the Congress to determine the political aim of the war as an important step for war planning. Once the political aim was determined, it was critical for the military leader to understand the political aim in order to develop strategic and tactical objectives. 
Theorists and Scholars on Termination
Both Joint and Army military doctrine might not have ignored the importance of conflict termination had doctrine writers paid closer attention to available military theory. The US Army had shown an interest in the work of Carl von Clausewitz.
Carl von Clausewitz a Prussian General and theorist wrote about the importance of the interrelationship of policy and strategy in his book On War, during the 1830s. Clausewitz, a veteran of the Napoleonic Wars, was influenced by the carnage and suffering of war. His goal in writing his book was to make sense of war, to define it and to describe the purpose of war.
10 Carl
Von Clausewitz convincingly points out the linkage between policy and strategy when he stated, "War is merely the continuation of policy by other means. We see, therefore, that war is not merely an act of policy but a true political instrument a continuation of political intercourse, carried on with other means. The Political object is the goal, war is the means of reaching it and means can never be considered in isolation of their purpose."
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In other words, war is a tool to be utilized to achieve the political goals of a country. Therefore, war and politics are inextricably linked together, senior civilian leaders and senior military leaders must not separate the two. Clausewitz's argument might have informed US doctrine about including termination among significant planning factors.
Clausewitz defined war as "the act of force to compel our enemy to do our will" Ibid, 75. focus on three factors with regard to the opponent. These three factors are the armed forces of the adversary, the country of the adversary (government and the citizenry), and the will of the enemy.
Clausewitz was convinced that a nation needed to either overthrow the enemy and defeat or convince the enemy through multiple means (conflict or coercion) to negotiate a settlement.
Achieving a settlement was possible by undermining the enemy's will to continue the fight.
Clausewitz's writings clearly emphasize the importance of termination even though he did not specifically use the term. This is important to note, because Clausewitz's writings on termination were read by senior military and civilian leaders so it was unlikely termination criteria was overlooked because these leaders were uniformed. However, the evidence shows that Clausewitz's ideas on ending a war were not included in military doctrine. Although military doctrine overlooked termination criteria US policy makers were not unaware of the importance of defining the conflict termination goals.
Professor Fred Ikle argued that determining how to end wars was something that most governments did not spend enough time considering prior to conflict. Professor Fred Ikle, was a former professor of political science and the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy in the Reagan Administration (1981) (1982) (1983) (1984) (1985) (1986) (1987) (1988) 
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Although General Thurman focused too much attention on major combat operations, Southern
Command, nevertheless, produced termination criteria in the post combat phase of the operation.
The planning and execution of Operation Promote Justice serves as evidence that civilian and the military leaders have not always failed to address conflict termination because they did not think that nation building is a military task. Nation building and termination were integral to the plan from the beginning.
Important assumptions made during planning for Operation Just Cause later proved false and adversely effected conflict termination. The first one was that the US military would be in charge of the country for 30 days at which time the newly elected President Endara and his two deputy vice presidents would assume responsibility. This later proved to be problematic because the planners did not understand how deeply the PDF controlled the government. Thus, when the PDF ceased to exist, so did much of the government. The second major assumption that proved false was that the infrastructure of Panama was in adequate shape. In fact, control measures were included in the Blue Spoon plan to limit collateral damage to infrastructure. It was later revealed that the infrastructure had badly decayed during years of neglect and required a great deal of reconstruction money, expertise and skilled labor to restore. 27 The third erroneous assumption was that reserve soldiers and the State Department would augment the Civil Military Operations Task Force. A failure to call up reserves and the lack of State Department personnel left the CMOTF understaffed. These flawed assumptions resulted in a longer troop commitment and extended the termination timetable. However, this evidence undermines the hypothesis that interventions are extended because unique circumstances. In the case of Panama, had the staff reviewed their assumptions, they would have realized that they had assumed away actions that were required and were easily anticipated.
The execution of Blind Logic had its own problems. The COMCMOTF was in charge of Blind Logic for one month. Although the Blind Logic planning documents give the COMCMOTF, a guidebook for restoring essential services, it was nevertheless incomplete. It did not restoration of public order, or the establishment of a police force, court system or jail system. Doctrine also devoted one page in chapter six (planning and executing operations) to discussing conflict termination. The chapter 6 section provided a short, albeit sufficient description detailing 35 Ibid, I-II. 36 Ibid, I-I2. 37 Ibid, I-13. 38 Ibid, III-31. The review of the doctrine available for planning of the US invasion of Haiti is significant. The doctrinal review refutes the explanation that doctrine did not address termination.
Conflict Termination and Operations in Haiti
When Joint Pub 3-0 dated 1993 was published, the importance of termination criteria was growing. The joint doctrine clearly showed that the senior military leader had an important role to play in the development of termination criteria with the senior civilian leadership. The doctrine also stressed that viable termination criteria was key to ensuring US objectives achieved using military intervention endured. In the end, the senior civilian and military leaders in the Clinton Administration developed termination criteria based largely on time instead of measure of success. Consequently, whatever was achieved through the military intervention did not endure.
Operation Uphold Democracy, the US intervention in Haiti lasted from 1994 to 1995.
The intervention is a good case from which to draw lessons learned about conflict termination in peacekeeping operations involving nation building, democratization and transfer of authority from a US led force to a United Nation's led operation. Operation Uphold Democracy was historically significant because its genesis was a United Nations Security Council Resolution 940, which was the first time the United Nations had approved invasion of a country in the Western 39 US Government, Field Manual 100-5 Operations, (Washington, DC, Department of the Army1993), Glossary 2. 40 Ibid, [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] [23] Hemisphere to conduct regime change. 41 Uphold Democracy is also unique because it began as a peace enforcement mission and changed at the last minute prior to execution into a peacekeeping mission. The operation involved over 20,000 US military personnel from all the military services. However because the exit was based strictly on a specified date, the departure would later be seen as undermining US interests in Haiti. In January, however, the planning was not predicated on a swift exit. Ibid, 163. commitment. Coming as it did only a year after the US withdrawal from Somalia, the decision was clearly influenced by the Somalia experience. The good news story at this point was that doctrine continued to emphasize the importance of termination planning in the post September 11, 2001 world. However, the bad news was that that the senior US civilian and military leaders did not follow the doctrine. the point at which the principal means of conflict shifts from the use or threat of use force to other means of persuasion. Conflict termination may take several forms: for example, the adversary may surrender, withdraw, or negotiate an end to the conflict. Commanders and staffs consider conflict termination requirements when developing campaign plans. If the endstate is a situation that promotes economic growth, for example, commanders consider the effects of destroying the economic infrastructure. Regardless of how the conflict ends, it often changes into less violent, but persistent forms of confrontation. Bush viewed regime change as the strategic opportunity to implant democracy in Iraq. 72 Initially, Operation Iraqi Freedom appeared to be just as successful as Operation Enduring Freedom.
Conflict Termination Post September 11, 2001 Conflict Termination and Operations in Afghanistan and Iraq
United States and coalition forces quickly invaded Iraq and overthrew Saddam's regime.
However, disjointed planning and poor execution marred the rapid success achieved during combat operations. Similar to the supposedly winning formula for Afghanistan, the US attempted to transfer quickly the of nation building task over to an outside entity. Consequently, the US strategic objectives achieved with astonishing success during major combat operations were undermined in the stability phase. In the end, the US owned responsibility for termination and nation building. Today, six years after the invasion, deployed troop strength still exceeds 100,000 It is perhaps ironic that he criticized President Clinton for deploying troops to Bosnia. President
Bush thought Bosnia was a poor choice for military intervention especially because there was no 72 Michael R. not all countries who pledged to provide support did so, which left the United States with a great deal more responsibility for stability tasks than originally anticipated.
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The problem created by the Bonn Agreement was an International Security Force that did not have enough combat power to affect security outside of the confines of Kabul. Additionally, there were no significant Afghan national police or military forces after the Taliban were overthrown. In most areas, the only authority was the local warlord who employed his own army to control his territory. Thus, as the United States attempted to draw down forces, it was stuck with maintaining a sizeable force (approximately two combat brigades) to provide security for the The Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance efforts were delayed from the start because of a deteriorating security situation following the overthrow of Saddam. The deteriorating security situation is directly attributable to the decision by Rumsfeld and Franks to use employ a small number of troops and to rely on Iraqi Police and Iraqi Army for security. In reality once coalition forces toppled Saddam's Regime, the standing police force and army dissolved, leaving a security vacuum, which the coalition was unable to fill. 105 The absence of law and order precipitated large scale looting and caused substantial damage to the infrastructure in Iraq; estimated at approximately $12 billion US. 106 The security vacuum and violence prevented ORHA from making progress toward restoration of Iraqi governance, and that in turn prolonged termination efforts.
Because ORHA found it difficult to make progress, it only lasted a total of four months.
The 107 President Bush's decision to create the CPA was significant in that it signaled to the world community that the US would finally assume responsibility for Iraq as an occupying power under the Hague and the Geneva Convention until the installation of a new Iraqi Government. 108 The creation of the CPA was also important for termination because it finally signified a determined effort to move the process of termination forward.
The US planning for termination operations in Afghanistan and Iraq clearly demonstrated the intent to handover termination to either the United Nations or the local government. This expectation was rooted in the US foreign policy and reflected United States reluctance to the US military and for nation building. The senior military and civilian leaders were focused on combat operations against terrorist cells. Ultimately, the United States was forced to create organizations 106 Ibid, 91.
107 Ibid, 70. 108 Ibid, 153. to provide for nation building. Additionally, despite foreign policy rhetoric, US military forces were forced to conduct nation-building operations out of necessity. Planning for conflict termination and achieving termination will continue to challenge the senior leaders of the United States in the coming years. This challenge will not get any easier particularly in the complex present day world. The September 11, 2001 attacks upon the US forever changed the world's dynamics and complicated termination planning. Because termination is ultimately a political decision, it is possible in the future that the US will repeat the same mistakes as cited in the case studies. However, it is incumbent upon the military planner to develop viable termination criteria. Joint doctrine and US Army are both a valuable source of information to assist with planning termination. The planner must make honest effort to ensure the military endstate is nested with the strategic endstate for an operation. The planning team must avoid basing termination solely on a timetable. A prudent planner should consider an exit strategy tied to realistic benchmarks instead of a time based approach.
Conclusion
Lastly, the planning team must avoid assuming that someone else will take care of termination. Military planners must presume the worst-case scenario, one in which the US is responsible for nation building. The planning headquarters must realize that nation building is not easy and requires a significant commitment of troops and capital for an extended period. Because nation building is complex, the planning effort must involve a whole of government approach.
Even in a best-case situation where another entity accepts responsibility for termination, the US has a responsibility to set the conditions for the transfer of authority. Regardless, the US has an obligation to monitor termination progress and must be prepared to intervene to ensure US goals endure.
